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Philosophia Mathematica Advance Access originally published online on January 28, 2007
Philosophia Mathematica 2007 15(1):30-53; doi:10.1093/philmat/nkl017
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Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press.

Book Review

Boolos on the justification of set theory{dagger}

Alexander Paseau

Wadham College, Oxford OX1 3PN, United Kingdom.

Correspondence: alexander.paseau{at}philosophy.ox.ac.uk

George Boolos has argued that the iterative conception of set justifies most, but not all, the ZFC axioms, and that a second conception of set, the Frege-von Neumann conception (FN), justifies the remaining axioms. This article challenges Boolos's claim that FN does better than the iterative conception at justifying the axioms in question.

For comments on earlier versions, I am grateful to Alex Oliver, Mary Leng, Michael Potter, Øystein Linnebo, Paul Benacerraf, Peter Smith, and three journal referees.


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