Philosophia Mathematica Advance Access originally published online on October 13, 2008
Philosophia Mathematica 2009 17(1):73-83; doi:10.1093/philmat/nkn029
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Deflating Existence Away? A Critique of Azzouni's Nominalism
* Philosophy Department, Felician College, 262 South Main Street, Lodi, NJ 07644, U.S.A. raleyy{at}felician.edu
In his Deflating Existential Consequence, Azzouni claims to be a nominalist. Yet, he also says that it is philosophically indeterminate which criterion for what exists is correct. Nominalism is the view that certain objects (i.e., abstract objects) do not exist, and not the view that it is philosophically indeterminate whether or not they do. I resolve the dilemma that Azzouni's claims pose: Azzouni is a non-factualist about what exists, but he is a factualist about which criterion for what exists our community of speakers has adopted. It is in the latter sense only that Azzouni can call himself a nominalist.
My thanks to Jody Azzouni and to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions.
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