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Philosophia Mathematica 2000 8(3):310-315; doi:10.1093/philmat/8.3.310
© 2000 by Oxford University Press
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© Oxford University Press

Reply to Dieterle

MARK BALAGUER*

*Department of Philosophy, California State University, Los Angeles, 5151 State University Drive, Los Angeles, California 90032-8114 U. S. A. mbalagu@calstatela.edu

In this paper, I respond to an objection that Jill Dieterle has raised to two arguments in my book, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Dieterle argues that because I reject the notion of metaphysical necessity, I cannot rely upon the notion of supervenience, as I in fact do in two places in the book. I argue that Dieterle is mistaken about this by showing that neither of the two supervenience theses that I endorse requires a notion of metaphysical necessity.


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