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Philosophia Mathematica Advance Access published online on January 30, 2008
Philosophia Mathematica, doi:10.1093/philmat/nkm043
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© The Author [2008]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Epistemic Optimism{dagger}

Mihai Ganea*

* Department of Philosophy, Boston University, Boston, Mass. 02215, U.S.A. mganea{at}bu.edu

Michael Dummett's argument for intuitionism can be criticized for the implicit reliance on the existence of what might be called absolutely undecidable statements. Neil Tennant attacks epistemic optimism, the view that there are no such statements. I expose what seem serious flaws in his attack, and I suggest a way of defending the use of classical logic in arithmetic that circumvents the issue of optimism.

{dagger} I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.


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