Philosophia Mathematica Advance Access published online on August 26, 2009
Philosophia Mathematica, doi:10.1093/philmat/nkp011
Ontology and the Word Exist: Uneasy Relations
* Department of Philosophy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass. 02155-7068, U.S.A. jodyazzouni{at}mindspring.com
An extensive exploration of the special properties of exist is here undertaken. Two of several results are: Denying that `exist has associated with it a set of necessary and sufficient conditions has seemed to a number of philosophers to imply metaphysical nihilism. This is because it has seemed that without such conditions the target domain of `existence is arbitrarily open. I show this is wrong. Second, my analysis sheds light on the puzzling question of what we are asking when we ask of something, `Does it exist? and mean that question in an ontically relevant way.
My thanks to Erin Eaker for invaluable comments on an earlier version of this paper.