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Philosophia Mathematica Advance Access originally published online on June 25, 2007
Philosophia Mathematica 2007 15(3):321-346; doi:10.1093/philmat/nkm028
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Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press.

Frege on Consistency and Conceptual Analysis{dagger}

Patricia A. Blanchette*

* Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556, U.S.A.

Correspondence: blanchette.1{at}nd.edu

Gottlob Frege famously rejects the methodology for consistency and independence proofs offered by David Hilbert in the latter's Foundations of Geometry. The present essay defends against recent criticism the view that this rejection turns on Frege's understanding of logical entailment, on which the entailment relation is sensitive to the contents of non-logical terminology. The goals are (a) to clarify further Frege's understanding of logic and of the role of conceptual analysis in logical investigation, and (b) to point out the extent to which his understanding of logic differs importantly from that of the model-theoretic tradition that grows out of Hilbert's work.

{dagger} Many thanks for helpful comments to Wilfrid Hodges, to Bob Hale, and to an anonymous referee.


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