Philosophia Mathematica Advance Access published online on August 8, 2007
Philosophia Mathematica, doi:10.1093/philmat/nkm025
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Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press.
The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces
* Philosophy Program, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 0200, Australia.
** Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia.
Correspondence: aidan{at}coombs.anu.edu.au
Correspondence: mcolyvan{at}usyd.edu.au
David Malament argued that Hartry Field's nominalisation program is unlikely to be able to deal with non-space-time theories such as phase-space theories. We give a specific example of such a phase-space theory and argue that this presentation of the theory delivers explanations that are not available in the classical presentation of the theory. This suggests that even if phase-space theories can be nominalised, the resulting theory will not have the explanatory power of the original. Phase-space theories thus raise problems for nominalists that go beyond Malament's initial concerns.
Thanks to Mark Steiner, Jens Christian Bjerring, Ben Fraser, John Mathewson, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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