Philosophia Mathematica Advance Access published online on September 22, 2008
Philosophia Mathematica, doi:10.1093/philmat/nkn025
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Empty de re Attitudes About Numbers
* Department of Philosophy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass. 02155-7068 U.S.A. jodyazzouni{at}mindspring.com
I dub a certain central tradition in philosophy of language (and mind) the de re tradition. Compelling thought experiments show that in certain common cases the truth conditions for thoughts and public-language expressions categorically turn on external objects referred to, rather than on linguistic meanings and/or belief assumptions. However, de re phenomena in language and thought occur even when the objects in question don't exist. Call these empty de re phenomena. Empty de re thought with respect to numeration is explored in this paper, and such thought with respect to hallucinations is touched on.
My thanks to both Erin Eaker and Thomas Hofweber for helpful comments on an earlier version of this.