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<title><![CDATA[Introduction]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tennant, N.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm049</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Introduction]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>3</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/4?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Carnap, Formalism, and Informal Rigour{dagger}]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/4?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Carnap's position on mathematical truth in <I>The Logical Syntax of Language</I> has been attacked from two sides: Kreisel argues that it is formalistic but should not be, and Friedman argues that it is not formalistic but needs to be. In this paper I argue that the Carnap of <I>Syntax</I> does not eliminate our ordinary notion of mathematical truth in favour of a formal analogue; so Carnap's notion of mathematical truth is not formalistic. I further argue that there is no conflict between Carnap's use of informal notions and his principle of tolerance; so Carnap's definition of mathematical truth need not be formalistic.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gregory, L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkl015</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Carnap, Formalism, and Informal Rigour{dagger}]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>24</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>4</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Carnap, Formalism, and Informal Rigour</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/25?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Intuition Between the Analytic-Continental Divide: Hermann Weyl's Philosophy of the Continuum]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/25?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Though logical positivism is part of Kant's complex legacy, positivists rejected both Kant's theory of intuition and his classification of mathematical knowledge as synthetic <I>a priori</I>. This paper considers some lingering defenses of intuition in mathematics during the early part of the twentieth century, as logical positivism was born. In particular, it focuses on the difficult and changing views of Hermann Weyl about the proper role of intuition in mathematics. I argue that it was not intuition in general, but his commitment to twodifferent types of intuition, which explains his rather unusual and tormented philosophy of the mathematical continuum.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Folina, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm017</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Intuition Between the Analytic-Continental Divide: Hermann Weyl's Philosophy of the Continuum]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>55</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>25</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[Intuitionism and Logical Syntax]]></title>
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<description><![CDATA[
<p>In <I>Logical Syntax of Language</I>, Rudolf Carnap became a chief proponent of the doctrine that the statements of intuitionism carry nonstandard intuitionistic meanings. This doctrine is linked to Carnap's &lsquo;Principle of Tolerance&rsquo; and claims he made on behalf of his notion of pure syntax. From premises independent of intuitionism, we argue that the doctrine, the Principle, and the attendant claims are mistaken, especially Carnap's repeated insistence that, in defining languages, logicians are free of commitment to mathematical statements intuitionists would reject.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[McCarty, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm047</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Intuitionism and Logical Syntax]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>77</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>56</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[Logic and Metaphysics: Heinrich Scholz and the Scientific World View{dagger}]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/78?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>The anti-metaphysical attitude of the neo-positivist movement is notorious. It is an essential mark of what its members regarded as the scientific world view. The paper focuses on a metaphysical variation of the scientific world view as proposed by Heinrich Scholz and his M&uuml;nster group, who can be regarded as a peripheral part of the movement. They used formal ontology for legitimizing the use of logical calculi. Scholz's relation to the neo-positivist movement and his contributions to logic and foundations are discussed. His heuristic background can be drawn from a set of six methodological &lsquo;articles of faith&rsquo;, formulated in 1942 and published here for the first time.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peckhaus, V.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm002</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Logic and Metaphysics: Heinrich Scholz and the Scientific World View{dagger}]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>90</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>78</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[Carnap, Godel, and the Analyticity of Arithmetic]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/100?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Michael Friedman maintains that Carnap did not fully appreciate the impact of G&ouml;del's first incompleteness theorem on the prospect for a purely syntactic definition of analyticity that would render arithmetic analytically true. This paper argues against this claim. It also challenges a common presumption on the part of defenders of Carnap, in their diagnosis of the force of G&ouml;del's own critique of Carnap in his Gibbs Lecture.</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tennant, N.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm045</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Carnap, Godel, and the Analyticity of Arithmetic]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>112</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>100</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Discussion note</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/113?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[LEO CORRY. David Hilbert and the Axiomatization of Physics (1898-1918)]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/113?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brading, K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm044</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[LEO CORRY. David Hilbert and the Axiomatization of Physics (1898-1918)]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>129</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>113</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Critical Studies/Book Reviews</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/130?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[MATTHIAS WILLE. Mathematics and the Synthetic A Priori: Epistemological Investigations into the Status of Mathematical Axioms]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/130?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Beisbart, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm030</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[MATTHIAS WILLE. Mathematics and the Synthetic A Priori: Epistemological Investigations into the Status of Mathematical Axioms]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>132</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>130</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Critical Studies/Book Reviews</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/132?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[TATIANA ARRIGONI. What is meant by V?: Reflections on the universe of all sets]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/132?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tiles, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm032</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[TATIANA ARRIGONI. What is meant by V?: Reflections on the universe of all sets]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>133</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>132</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Critical Studies/Book Reviews</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/133?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[THOMAS MCKAY. Plural Predication]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/133?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Burgess, J. P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm033</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[THOMAS MCKAY. Plural Predication]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>140</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>133</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Critical Studies/Book Reviews</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/140?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Jesper Lutzen. Mechanistic Images in Geometric Form: Heinrich Hertz's Principles of Mechanics]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/140?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Pincock, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm037</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Jesper Lutzen. Mechanistic Images in Geometric Form: Heinrich Hertz's Principles of Mechanics]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>144</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>140</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Critical Studies/Book Reviews</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/145?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[ALAN RICHARDSON and THOMAS UEBEL. The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/145?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm046</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[ALAN RICHARDSON and THOMAS UEBEL. The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>145</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>145</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Books of Essays</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/146?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[BART VAN KERKHOVE and JEAN PAUL VAN BENDEGEM, eds. Perspectives on Matmatical Practices: Bringing Together Philosophy of Mathematics, Sociology of Mathematics, and Mathematics Education]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/146?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm013</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[BART VAN KERKHOVE and JEAN PAUL VAN BENDEGEM, eds. Perspectives on Matmatical Practices: Bringing Together Philosophy of Mathematics, Sociology of Mathematics, and Mathematics Education]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>146</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>146</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Books of Essays</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/147?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[AGUSTIN RAYO and GABRIEL UZQUIANO, eds. Absolute Generality]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/147?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm012</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[AGUSTIN RAYO and GABRIEL UZQUIANO, eds. Absolute Generality]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>147</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>147</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Books of Essays</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/148?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[MICHAEL FRIEDMAN and ALFRED NORDMANN, editors. The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/148?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm007</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[MICHAEL FRIEDMAN and ALFRED NORDMANN, editors. The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>148</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>148</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Books of Essays</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/149?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[NATHALIE SINCLAIR, DAVID PIMM, and WILLIAM HIGGINSON, eds. Mathematics and the Aesthetic: New Approaches to an Ancient Affinity]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/149?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm031</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[NATHALIE SINCLAIR, DAVID PIMM, and WILLIAM HIGGINSON, eds. Mathematics and the Aesthetic: New Approaches to an Ancient Affinity]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>149</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>149</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Books of Essays</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/150?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[KAREN FRANCOIS and JEAN PAUL VAN BENDEGEM, eds. Philosophical Dimensions in Mathematics Education]]></title>
<link>http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/16/1/150?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-03-20</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/philmat/nkm048</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[KAREN FRANCOIS and JEAN PAUL VAN BENDEGEM, eds. Philosophical Dimensions in Mathematics Education]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>Oxford University Press</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>16</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>150</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>150</prism:startingPage>
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